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Tunnel Vision: ‘‘Invisible’’
Highways and Boston’s
‘‘Big Dig’’ in the Age of
Privatization
Michael R. Fein1
Abstract
While most analyses of late-twentieth-century highway policy suggest a shift toward open system
design, bottom-up federalism, and the devolution of transportation governance, the history of
Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel project, informally known as the ‘‘Big Dig,’’ runs counter to this
trend. Though the project emerged in the 1970s during a time of unprecedented citizen activism
in transportation planning, ultimately the privatization of political power proved to be the Big Dig’s
most important legacy for twenty-first-century urban highway projects.
Keywords
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The American Interstate Highway System reached its half-century mark on June 29, 2006. The
anniversary prompted an outpouring of public commentary on the state of America’s superhighways,
a ‘‘Celebrate the Interstate!’’ campaign by the American Association of State Highway and Transpor-
tation Officials, and a cross-country convoy that recreated the famous trek U.S. Army Lt. Colonel
Dwight D. Eisenhower took in 1919, first sparking his interest in improving the nation’s roads.1 The
triumphal spirit, however, did not last long. Less than two weeks later, 12 tons of concrete ceiling
panels fell in a recently opened section of Interstate-90 (I-90) tunnels—part of Boston’s Central
Artery/Tunnel project informally known as the ‘‘Big Dig’’—and crushed a motorist to death.2
The troubled history of the Big Dig is a compelling story in its own right, as well as an important
coda to the larger narrative of the interstate system of express highways. Most analysts of late-
twentieth-century US highway policy have emphasized the downward shift in governing authority
that followed the Freeway Revolts: a series of citizen movements that challenged the routing deci-
sions and top–down planning processes of the highway builders during the interstate era.3 But the
history of the Big Dig, which was developed in the aftermath of the Freeway Revolts, reveals a more
complex portrait of political change in the post-interstate era. Though the project emerged in the
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1970s during a time of unprecedented citizen activism in transportation planning, ultimately the
privatization of political power, rather than its localization, proved to be the Big Dig’s most
distinguishing characteristic.
The Big Dig’s designers, particularly Fred Salvucci, conceived of the project as an alternative
to the elevated highway that had slashed through Boston in the 1950s. The original expressway, a
40-foot high wall of concrete and steel, cut off Boston from its historic waterfront and displaced
20,000 residents. Engineered to carry 75,000 vehicles per day, it soon became severely overloaded,
carrying more than twice that before the Central Artery tunnels opened in 2003.
The elevated expressway had been the product of the top–down, bureaucratic style of decision
making that characterized the work of highway engineers during the interstate era.4 The depressed
Central Artery was the product of a different age. Boston, like many other cities rocked by the Free-
way Revolts of the late 1960s, engaged in a major reevaluation of its transportation planning review
process during the 1970s. Highway planners solicited input from a wide range of citizens and experts
in the crafting of transportation policy, and they ultimately terminated most of their more ambitious
plans for additional expressways within the Boston metropolitan area. The notable exceptions to this
construction freeze were the artery project and a proposed new tunnel under Boston Harbor. Each
had its strong advocates. Neighborhood activists and Boston Mayor Kevin White favored burying
the artery and reclaiming the above-ground urban landscape; the business community wanted the
tunnel, with its improved airport access. During the 1970s and ‘80s, Governors Francis Sargent
(Rep., 1969–75) and Michael Dukakis (Dem., 1975-79, 1983-91), as well as Fred Salvucci, a top
Boston-area transportation expert, provided critical political support for the projects, which together
were intended to reduce traffic congestion in Boston’s central business district, reunite the city and
its waterfront, provide new parkland, improve air quality, and complete the final link in the Seattle-
to-Boston I-90 superhighway, as laid out in the original Eisenhower-era Interstate plan (Figure 1).
While these projects were rooted in a locally sensitive design process and depended on support
from neighborhood groups, business interests, and local politicians and officials, they also relied
heavily on federal assistance. Congressional legislators, eager to hasten the completion of the inter-
state system, had set a September 1983 deadline for state departments of transportation to file envi-
ronmental impact statements for uncompleted sections of highway or face the elimination of those
routes. With time running out and significant federal subsidies at stake, the deadline put pressure on
the Massachusetts Congressional delegation to commit to the project or abandon hope of pursuing it
in the future. In the end, they joined city and state officials as they aggressively sought and, in 1987,
won support for the Big Dig in Washington.5
Federal assistance did not come without costs. The Central Artery/Tunnel project, already an
ambitious one, grew more so as state transportation officials sought to comply with federal regula-
tions. In 1984, officials at the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) demanded that the under-
ground expressway significantly expand the number of lane miles beyond those of the original
elevated structure, since the FHWA was not in the business of funding ‘‘urban beautification proj-
ects.’’ The project also grew larger as designers addressed federal requirements to mitigate the
impact of construction on businesses and the environment.6
Cost estimates began rising even before the 1991 groundbreaking. In the process, the tenor of the
project changed dramatically. By the middle of the decade, project managers faced intense pres-
sure—from the US Congress, the US Department of Transportation, state and local officials, and
citizens themselves—to bring the project to completion and to rein in billion-dollar cost overruns.
State legislators responded with a series of changes to the rules and institutional structures under
which Big Dig management operated, all of which tended to increase the power of private contrac-
tors and limit the scope of public oversight. The Big Dig was completed in 2006. But the sacrifice of
transparency, oversight, and accountability in finishing the project left behind a troubling legacy,
one which was sealed with the tunnel’s fatal collapse in July of that year.
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Ironically, the Big Dig, which stemmed from popular efforts during the 1960s and ‘70s to restore
citizen control to transportation planning, will largely be remembered as a lesson in the perils of pri-
vatization. Trapped in a kind of ‘‘tunnel vision,’’ city and state officials pursued a set of transpor-
tation policies that had extraordinarily high costs: in dollars, in foreclosed transportation
alternatives, and in human life. Importantly, not all of these costs can be attributed to privatization,
as the privatizers themselves sought to escape problems engendered by the bottom-up design pro-
cess: the creeping scope and extensive mitigations that stemmed from the desire to maintain local
support and federal subvention. But the privatizers’ willingness to sacrifice oversight and transpar-
ency compounded these costs, and made the project’s cost overruns and fatal design errors appear all
Figure 1. The overloaded Fitzgerald expressway (Courtesy of Massachusetts Department of Transportation
[MassDOT] library).
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the more galling in the public eye. The highly publicized nature of these costs has, to some extent,
‘‘poisoned the well,’’ making future expressway tunnels and other bold highway transportation
initiatives much more difficult to advance. Indeed, this analysis of the Big Dig suggests that its his-
tory prompted a major reassessment of US transportation policy. As other city officials contem-
plated construction in the shadow of the Big Dig, they forced a reckoning with public officials’
power to deliver on the promise of the new style of intergovernmental relations that emerged in the
post-interstate era. For with its scale, complexity and storied past, the Big Dig revisits precisely the
same issues that brought the interstate era to an end: those of authority and accountability, transpar-
ency and oversight, and democratic involvement in the policy-making process.
The Big Dig and the Promise of ‘‘Invisible’’ Highways
In 1998, the US Congress passed the largest public works bill in the nation’s history, dedicating $217
billion to address its failing transportation infrastructure.7 City and state transportation officials
divided on how to spend this money. Salt Lake City spent $1.6 billion to build a new, twelve-lane
expressway linking its suburbs and metropolitan areas. In contrast, Milwaukee drew on $20 million
in federal subsidies to dismantle a half-built section of interstate highway that cut through its historic
downtown. It was one of the nation’s largest highway deconstruction projects.8 The contrast
between the two examples is telling: city planners believed that they had to either build on prece-
dent, expanding the interstate highway system in order to help speed commuters in and out of the
city or reject it altogether in order to revive urban life.
Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel project appeared to promise a way out of this policy stalemate.
And it is only the most notable example of a trend, dating to the 1970s, toward addressing traffic
problems by routing them underground. Plans have also been widely discussed for tunnels else-
where in the United States, most spiritedly in the states of New York, California, and Washington.
Certainly obstacles, primarily cost, remained. But carving out improved urban corridors was no longer
an unthinkable endeavor. Burying highways beneath, rather than above, the urban landscape—making
once visible roads ‘‘invisible’’—seemed to make possible the revitalization of major highway initia-
tives that had stalled after the Freeway Revolts.
For much of the 1950s and ‘60s, road builders had turned a deaf ear toward the negative social
impact of highways. But by the 1970s, highway critics had transformed the entire framework of
transportation politics. In 1966, the appointment of Alan S. Boyd to head the newly created US
Department of Transportation gave opponents of urban expressways their first significant advocate
for local control in Washington. Boyd’s insistence on viewing expressways as integral to community
health emboldened Massachusetts anti-highway activists and city leaders, such as Boston Mayor
Kevin White, to persuade Governor Francis Sargent to reevaluate existing highway plans and issue
a moratorium on major highway construction in 1970. The following year, Alan Altshuler, Massa-
chusetts Secretary of Transportation and chair of the Boston Transportation Planning Review, pio-
neered the ‘‘open study’’ planning model. Unlike earlier planning models, study leaders encouraged
citizen participation, evaluated highway and transit on equal footing, worked at the community as
well as the regional level, and sought to explain technical details to nonspecialists. Thus, by the
mid-seventies, anti-highway groups had gained a favorable position from which to influence new
projects, making it increasingly difficult for potentially disruptive highway construction to win
approval in American cities.9
More recent highway legislation, most notably the landmark Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 and its subsequent reauthorizations, continued to privilege local actors in the
setting of transportation policy. But it remained to be seen whether major highway construction—
this time in the form of underground roadways—could be resuscitated without a return to the distant,
unresponsive bureaucracies, and the closed system planning style that characterized the interstate
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era. The interstate system emerged out of a set of planning procedures intended to limit citizen input.
Public protest helped generate a more open and responsive transportation planning process, provid-
ing a receptive forum for modern, locally sensitive tunneling projects.10 Yet, the sheer complexity of
tunnel construction ensured that some aspects of project management remained insulated from pub-
lic oversight. Moreover, the high cost of the Big Dig produced mounting pressure on project man-
agers and public officials, who were soon entangled in charges of mismanagement, fraud, and
criminal negligence. This misfeasance created another public backlash, similar in intensity to the
Freeway Revolts, against the Big Dig. Despite the commitment to a more open process than that
of the 1950s and ‘60s, then, the new ‘‘invisible’’ highways of the 1990s fueled resistance to public
works megaprojects carried out by officials and engineers with little public accountability.
The Big Dig and the New Road-Building Paradigm
Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel project constituted the most expensive urban highway project in the
history of the United States. The $15 billion project replaced the six-lane elevated expressway (Inter-
state-93) with a 7.5-mile, eight-to-ten-lane underground expressway running beneath the city and a
fourteen-lane cable-stayed bridge over the Charles River. It also provided for a third tunnel under the
Boston Harbor, linking the Massachusetts Turnpike (I-90) with Logan International Airport. All
told, the project consisted of 160-lane miles.11 Such a costly and ambitious project could not
advance without federal subvention, and it did not become viable until a 1987 battle in the US Con-
gress resulted in 85 percent federal funding for the project. At that point, the cost of the final link in
the US Interstate Highway System was estimated at $3.2 billion. Congress continued to fund the
project over the next decade, even as changes in design and scope caused its projected cost to bal-
loon, by 1998, to $10.8 billion (Figure 2).12
Several interrelated causes accounted for these cost overruns. The first was the technical complexity
of the project. Tunneling beneath the citymeant contendingwith an assortment of existing subterranean
obstacles, including utilities, subway tracks, and the residue of the city’s former coastline. Workers on
the project routinely uncovered the remnants of old wharves, long since buried by back-fill, dating from
Boston’s expansion beyond the narrow peninsula that was its original shoreline. The ground was so
unstable in one area that contractors had to freeze the soil in order to tunnel through it, while supporting
the elevated highway still in use above. In another section, the tunnelwas constructed just inches over an
operational subway tube. A third area required the construction of an on-site casting basin (large enough
to hold an aircraft carrier) in order to produce the tunnel segments that were too large to be brought by
barge under the low bridges that crossed the Fort Point Channel.13
Another part of the project’s complexity grew out of its guiding philosophy, which differed from
that of the interstate system. Indeed, its philosophy was a clear manifestation of the backlash against
interstate politics. When the original elevated expressway was built, the mantra of the age had been
‘‘you can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.’’ Now it was closer to the physician’s oath: ‘‘first,
do no harm.’’14 As Massachusetts Secretary of Transportation Fred Salvucci wondered, when first
considering a tunnel in place of the expressway during the Sargent administration, ‘‘How can we do
that? It’s ugly, but it’s carrying two hundred thousand cars a day. We’re going to put a sign up at the
Charles River that says, ‘City Closed for Alteration—Come Back in a Decade’?’’15 And so, as the
project evolved, designers had to ensure that the work could be completed without significant
obstruction to the flow of traffic and commerce in and out of the city.
Thus, ‘‘mitigations’’—the practice of mollifying critics through a wide variety of accommoda-
tions—amounted to $3 billion or about one-third of the entire cost increase during the life of the
project. Some of these mitigations resulted from compromises designed to win over environmental-
ists and residential and commercial opponents. When the project destroyed wetlands, project man-
agers agreed to build a park elsewhere. When noise and fumes from construction bothered residents
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and business owners, they paid for soundproof windows and air conditioning. Other expenditures,
especially eminent domain costs, were critiqued as indefensible waste: for example, $50 million for
a parking lot intended for dirt-handling, but which was barely used; another $15 million to house the
Boston Celtics’ famed parquet floor during construction.16
An additional $3 billion in cost overruns resulted from project redesigns. Officials at the FHWA,
willing to fund projects that increased traffic capacity but not ‘‘urban beautification projects,’’
insisted that the Central Artery be widened in order to be eligible for federal funding. Popular resis-
tance led to the abandonment of early plans for a ‘‘spaghetti-bowl’’ interchange across the Charles.
Further controversy required the relocation of the East Boston connection. Design errors necessi-
tated changes to the Fort Point Channel section.17 All told, delays surrounding negotiations, mitiga-
tions, and redesign led to more than $6 billion in cost inflation.
A wide array of political actors and business elites kept the project afloat during this period. Mas-
sachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis appointed Salvucci, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) trained engineer, longtime transportation adviser and astute political operator, as project
manager. Both remained strong state-level advocates during the design phase in the 1980s. City
Figure 2. The Central Artery/Tunnel project (Courtesy of Massachusetts Department of Transportation
[MassDOT] library).
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leaders, such as Mayors Kevin White (Dem., 1968–83) and Ray Flynn (Dem., 1984–93), dropped
their resistance to the project once they were able to exact concessions with regard to labor practices,
routing decisions, and control of ‘‘air rights’’ above the depressed artery. The enormously influential
Speaker of the House Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill (Mass. – Dem.) helped override a presidential veto
of the initial funding legislation in 1987. The Artery Business Committee (ABC), a group of sixty
Boston executives with a million-dollar budget and representing the city’s major real estate interests,
banks, and utility companies, also played a crucial role. The organization’s members preserved
political support for the project, reconciling feuding officials, and ensuring that the Big Dig main-
tained momentum as construction proceeded in the 1990s (Figure 3).18
Analysts of the Big Dig, Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff, have suggested that this project
emerged out of a new paradigm of governance that they refer to as ‘‘bottom-up federalism.’’19 Under
this governing paradigm, megaprojects grew out of local initiatives and relied on intensive local
engagement but depended heavily on federal grants-in-aid. To this end, Altshuler and Luberoff place
great emphasis on local civic constituents (e.g., the ABC) and local political leadership (e.g., the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority [MTA]) as instrumental to the success of the Big Dig. Similarly,
historian Thomas P. Hughes has commented on the significance of the Central Artery/Tunnel proj-
ect’s ‘‘open system’’ design process, which abandoned the rigid engineering hierarchies of the inter-
state era. Instead, Big Dig planners relied on a more horizontal organizing structure that included a
range of transportation and nontransportation interest groups.20 In this way, the Big Dig’s design
process was consistent with other recent national shifts in transportation planning, featured most
notably in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991.21 Historian Mark
Rose has pointed out that this legislation continued to fund highway construction through federal
grants-in-aid, but it ‘‘devolved’’ the authority to plan and implement highway projects (and other
Figure 3. Secretary of Transportation Fred Salvucci and Governor Michael Dukakis (Courtesy of Massachu-
setts Department of Transportation [MassDOT] library).
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alternative transportation schemes) from engineering professionals at the federal and state level to
local politicians situated within Metropolitan Planning Organizations. These entities were intended
to be more responsive to community interests than federal and state engineers had been in the inter-
state era, but they also lacked the willingness and ability to coordinate among transportation proj-
ects, and thus faced new challenges to their effectiveness.22
‘‘Bottom-up federalism,’’ ‘‘open systems,’’ and ‘‘devolution’’ all represented a profound shift in
governing philosophies, legal structures, and political institutions. These changes in governance
stemmed from criticisms that highway policy had for too long been set by the distant authority of
state and federal engineers, who were swayed more by the pressures of traffic surveys than by the
concerns of local citizens. In significant ways, though, the building of the Big Dig ran counter to this
trend toward increased democratic involvement. Despite the power wielded by the ABC and the
authority vested in the MTA, ultimately it was not the localization but, more precisely, the priva-
tization of the Big Dig’s administration that was its most significant feature. Privatization created
a new set of incentives and structures of accountability that led the project coordinators into big
trouble. And while in time the Central Artery/Tunnel project will likely be remembered for the
engineering marvel that it is, from a political standpoint, the ‘‘Big Pig’’ is less of a model of how
to blend expert authority and the democratic process than it is a warning about the thorniness of
megaproject politics—and that has had significant ramifications for the future of other major
urban transportation initiatives.23
The Big Dig in the Age of Privatization
As the scope of the Central Artery/Tunnel project expanded and construction got underway dur-
ing the 1990s, three developments materialized around the project’s management that became
flash points in the emerging controversy over the Big Dig. The first involved the ABC, whose
leaders sought to keep the project’s setbacks from becoming political fodder. The second
related to the transfer of project management from the Massachusetts Highway Department
to the MTA, a public corporation that, in the words of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, ‘‘was not part of the machinery of government.’’24 The last concerned the creation of
an Integrated Project Organization scheme, which put on the staff of the MTA hundreds of per-
sonnel from Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB), the project’s lead joint venture contractor
comprised of two of the world’s most experienced companies in massive infrastructure
development.
As early as 1994, B/PB managers reported to the state highway department that the project was
likely to approach the $14 billion mark. Nonetheless, the contractors refrained from issuing public
statements about the likelihood of cost overruns. According to B/PB Chairman John MacDonald, the
firm not only faced pressure to ‘‘hold the line on project costs,’’ they were also ‘‘forcefully
reminded’’ by state project directors and transportation officials that ‘‘responsibility for public dis-
cussion of project issues rested exclusively with the public officials managing the project.’’25 This
point was underscored in a confidential March 1995 memo, in which a state-level deputy project
director instructed Bechtel’s budget manager to ‘‘assemble a ‘sanitized’ review package’’ for fed-
eral officials that excluded detailed cost data.26 By November 1995, however, rumors of the proj-
ect’s ballooning cost had reached the Massachusetts Congressional delegation. Senator Ted
Kennedy and Senator John Kerry (who, at the time, faced an electoral challenge by Republican
Governor William Weld), sent a letter to US Transportation Secretary Federico Pen˜a expressing
‘‘considerable concern’’ that the Big Dig’s ‘‘projected cost will soar ever higher and its completion
date recede ever further into the future.’’27
Angered at the prospect of his home Congressional delegation pushing for more aggressive fed-
eral investigation into the project, ABC president Richard Dimino chided Kerry’s use of the Big Dig
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‘‘as a kind of political football.’’ Instead, Dimino, himself a former Boston Transportation
Commissioner, called for a ‘‘full consensus of public officials to keep this project moving forward.’’
Four years later, in Senate Commerce Committee hearings on the very cost overruns that he probed
in 1996, Kerry weakly acknowledged that he had ‘‘raised some of these questions’’ at that time. ‘‘But
regrettably,’’ Kerry explained, ‘‘the nature of the political contest then sort of precluded those ques-
tions from being answered in a way that did not also carry with it a sort of political baggage, and it
was a little bit lost in the electoral process.’’ Dimino, an unwavering advocate of the project, later
claimed that he was less interested in silencing ‘‘objective critiques’’ of the project than he was in
preventing ‘‘rhetorical shots across the bow.’’28 Nonetheless, it seems clear that the ABC intention-
ally sought to keep the Big Dig from delay, even if that meant limiting legislative oversight.
The privatization of the Big Dig included more than just the dampening of political criticism by
high-powered corporate elites. It had to do with the structure of governance itself. A year after Kerry
dropped his push for closer scrutiny of the Big Dig, the state Legislature and Governor Weld (Rep.,
1991–97) adopted a plan to transfer ownership of the project from the Massachusetts Highway
Department, a state agency, to the MTA, a public corporation. The primary reason for the Big
Dig’s transfer to MTA management was to gain access to its toll revenues. These were increased
in 1997 in order to cover the Big Dig’s rising price tag, a move that allowed the state to retain
access to federal subsidies.
This transfer also gave Governor Weld and his transportation secretary, James Kerasiotes, the
opportunity to further insulate the project from government oversight. Unlike their predecessors,
Dukakis and Salvucci, Weld and Kerasiotes were vocal critics of state bureaucracy and strong
believers in privatization and the logic of market efficiencies. Riding a wave of public dissatisfac-
tion with state government, Weld had made the privatization of public functions a hallmark of his
campaign and administration, exhibiting nothing but disdain even for longtime civil servants,
whom he once described as ‘‘walruses.’’29 He had even sought, unsuccessfully, to dismantle and
privatize the operations of the MTA in 1991. The MTA had been chartered by the state in 1952 to
build the Massachusetts Turnpike from the New York state line to Boston. Forty years later, it had
grown into an immensely powerful institution, generating $140 million in annual toll revenue.
And though the MTA faced regular critiques for wastefulness and lack of public accountability,
the legal obligations surrounding its multi-million dollar bond offerings made it practically invul-
nerable to Weld’s threat of eradication (Figure 4).30
With the MTA seemingly impervious to reform, Weld opted in 1996 to install Kerasiotes,
described by a founding member of the ABC as ‘‘a drill sergeant the likes of which I’ve never seen,’’
as chairman of the authority. The following year he incorporated the Central Artery and Tunnel into
the newly designated Metropolitan Highway System and transferred control of those roads from the
Massachusetts Highway Department to the MTA. Thus, by 1997, Kerasiotes had total control over
the Big Dig as well as an agency with its own personnel and budget structure. Importantly, the MTA
stood outside the review of the Executive Office for Administration and Finance, the state office
described by Secretary of A&F Andrew Natsios as the ‘‘command and control center’’ for spending
oversight.31
At the time of this critical shift in Big Dig control, questions of oversight were eclipsed by debate
over who would bear the greatest financial burden under the MTA’s new toll structures. The ABC
fended off suburbanites’ legal challenges to the increased tolls. And Kerasiotes downplayed the
change in governance structure, focusing instead on the importance of fulfilling Weld’s directive
to rein in project costs.32 Unlike Salvucci, Kerasiotes attached little value to public sector oversight.
As he explained in a 1994 interview, he intended to manage highway projects
[l]ike I would do in my business. I would go out and I would hire someone to do something that I need to
get done. Now, what level of oversight am I going to employ when I hire a contractor to build, say, my
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office space? Very little. All I want to know is, is my office going to be where I want it to be? Are the
walls going to look like I want them to look? And am I going to be comfortable when I sit down in it?
Other than that, I don’t want to [expletive] know about it.33
Kerasiotes sought less oversight and more accountability. Like Weld, however, he believed that
market forces could provide the necessary incentives to ensure contractor accountability since pri-
vate contractors relied on project success to generate future business.34 With the toll issues dom-
inating public attention and a privatizer such as Kerasiotes at the helm, few worried about the
implications of falling back onto older models of governance, like those of the interstate era, in
which highway construction was insulated from close public watchfulness.35
With the Central Artery/Tunnel project removed from direct state supervision under the MTA,
the leadership made another move—again in the name of cutting costs—that further shielded the
project from public scrutiny. In 1998, the MTA and B/PB engaged in a shift in managerial struc-
ture labeled ‘‘Integrated Project Organization.’’ This scheme was designed to eliminate redun-
dant personnel and streamline relations between the project manager (the MTA) and its
primary contractor (B/PB) as they moved from the design to the construction phase. Close to
200 B/PB employees were moved on to the MTA payroll. This move accomplished two things
simultaneously: it pushed those salaries off B/PB’s accounting sheets, and it suggested that the
MTA was showing new resolve in fast-tracking the project.36 It also made it increasingly difficult
for key personnel—reporting to Bechtel but sitting on the MTA’s payroll—to objectively review
cost-plus contracts or to engage in meaningful data sharing and cost recovery efforts related to
work quality.37
Figure 4. Secretary of Transportation James Kerasiotes and Governor William Weld (Courtesy of Massachu-
setts Department of Transportation [MassDOT] library).
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These developments—the strengthening of the ABC in muting political criticism, the shifting of
project management to the more politically independent MTA, and the close partnering of the MTA
and its chief contractor B/PB—reflected an emerging consensus in favor of bringing the project to
completion as quickly as possible, and in relying on private sector initiative to do it. According to
one analyst of Massachusetts politics, these moves toward privatization also ‘‘fit the anti-big-
government, anti-public-employee . . . position of most Republicans and increasingly the electo-
rate’’ during the 1990s.38 According to Kerasiotes and others, minimizing public oversight was
a necessary response to the increasingly hostile environment Big in which Dig project managers
operated, beset, so it seemed, by an increasingly cynical public and ever more demanding regula-
tors. But their strategies—dissembling to the media, hiding cost accounting details from the feds,
muting public debate and upsetting the system of checks and balances that traditionally define the
roles of project owner and lead contractor—carried their own set of devastating consequences. For
once the MTA entered into a partnership arrangement with B/PB, it became increasingly difficult
for MTA officials to exercise effective managerial oversight over its lead contractor, especially
with regard to quality of work and cost control. And with the MTA’s work insulated from the Sec-
retary of Administration and Finance’s review, the potential for the Big Dig to get into big trouble
reached new heights.
Big Trouble
Any tunneling project on the scale of the Big Dig was bound to have its share of blunders: joints
that leaked; tunnel sections that failed to line up; blueprints indicating open land for construction
staging where a major sporting arena was located. But what really got the Big Dig into big trouble
was the sort of problems that reflected on the nature of the policy-making practice, and ultimately
on the rules and structures of government institutions. Though the ‘‘open study’’ and ‘‘bottom-up
federalism’’—practices adopted after the Freeway Revolts—were intended to return a significant
level of citizen control to transportation planning, old conflicts over the appropriate balance
between efficiency and democratic involvement in policy making returned by the 1990s. At the
national level, President George H. W. Bush signed into law the ISTEA of 1991, enhancing local
control over highway planning.39 But, at the same time, Massachusetts voters elected Governor
William Weld, a politician intent on orienting transportation in an entirely different direction.
Weld campaigned in 1990 on a popular antigovernment, antitax platform, promising to bring
business-minded efficiency to a state government that he argued was beset with bloated bureau-
cracy. His landslide reelection in 1994 offered clear evidence of continued public support for the
privatization of public functions and provided crucial backing to his efforts to transform Massachu-
setts highway politics. Like Weld, James Kerasiotes also thought that public sector bureaucrats were
little more than a hindrance to effective administration. Famously, as transportation secretary, he
kept a hatchet mounted on the wall behind his desk, put there at a time when career civil servants
from the Salvucci era were being fired by the dozens.40 As chair of the MTA, Kerasiotes also
viewed the public itself as a potential obstacle to the Central Artery/Tunnel project, with citizens
willing to lend support so long as it was ‘‘pain free,’’ built on optimistic timelines and cost esti-
mates, with few costs charged to local governments. Within this political climate, MTA leadership
(and by extension, B/PB) felt a strong incentive to feed the public a steady stream of misinforma-
tion, to rely on lax accounting practices, and to decisively shut down any threat of government
inquiry that might have shed light on the project’s skyrocketing costs and lead to a backlash of
the sort that shut down Interstate construction.41
The MTA-B/PB Integrated Project Organization was not even a year old when, in 1998, it con-
fronted its first major crisis over just these sorts of issues: citing a breach of public trust, Congress
refused to further fund the Central Artery/Tunnel project. Cost estimates now stood at $10.8 billion,
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and the federal government capped its share at just over $8.5 billion. In May 2000, Senator John
McCain (Arizona-Rep.), a vocal critic of the Big Dig, held Congressional hearings into the project’s
cost. He framed his critique in the language of small government and fiscal conservatism used to
assault liberal Democratic policies, of which the Big Dig seemed an especially easy target. ‘‘In
1985,’’ McCain proclaimed, ‘‘it was supposed to cost 2.5 billion dollars. Now we do not even know
if it is going to cost thirteen point something. The taxpayers deserve a lot better than that. A lot better
than that.’’ Though Senator Kerry was quick to remind Senator McCain that Congress had, year after
year, embraced the project’s ‘‘vision change,’’ McCain took the opportunity the hearings presented
to heap scorn on the project’s managers in front of a national audience.42
Certainly there were plenty of reasons to conclude, as McCain had, that Big Dig leadership was
guilty of ‘‘gross mismanagement,’’ exacerbated by the FHWA’s ‘‘complete lack of federal over-
sight.’’43 MTA Chairman James Kerasiotes had been fired only a month earlier for his February
2000 disclosure that the Central Artery/Tunnel costs would increase by another $1.4 billion. The
appearance of this announcement on the same day that the FHWA had signed off on the project’s
finance plan further undermined McCain’s confidence in the agency’s ‘‘ability to fulfill its steward-
ship responsibilities.’’44
State and federal investigations produced shocking revelations. Under Kerasiotes, the MTA had
engaged in the deliberate withholding of financial data in order to maintain the public perception that
the project was progressing at cost and on schedule. One way this fiction was maintained was by
using a dubious $827 million federal insurance credit—allegedly due to the project in 2017—as
an offset to the project’s bottom line. This and other questionable accounting practices led the Secu-
rity and Exchange Commission to issue a ruling against Kerasiotes and the MTA after these mislead-
ing data were included in federally mandated reports accompanying three bond issuances.45
While public sector administrators are not immune to this kind of creative accounting, the auton-
omy of public authorities often leaves them lacking the necessary vigilance to keep such misconduct
at bay.46 Though Kerasiotes andWeld had frequently made the claim that they wished to offset over-
sight with new levels of accountability, by the late 1990s it was clear that the steady devaluation of
transparency in transportation governance was not paying off. Indeed, any short-term benefits Ker-
asiotes may have gleaned from concealing information from federal officials, bondholders, and the
electorate were lost in a costly backlash, against both Kerasiotes, who was fired in 2000, and the
MTA, which would finally be dismantled in 2009.
As this backlash unfolded, top officials at the US Department of Transportation grew concerned
over how federal tax dollars were being spent on the Big Dig and began a closer review of the
MTA’s finance plan in 1999. Prior to this time, the finance plans were reviewed at the FHWA’s
Massachusetts field office. Now US Department of Transportation Inspector General Kenneth Mead
gave the project a more meticulous examination. He shared a draft report with MTA officials in
October that questioned the financial basis of the project, including the ‘‘improper retention of fed-
eral funds for investment purposes.’’ Mead received what he described as an ‘‘adamant’’ and ‘‘overly
vitriolic’’ retort, in which MTA project director Pat Moynihan blasted him for espousing a
‘‘backward-looking management technique that is unworkable and shows a fundamental lack of
understanding of how a multibillion dollar megaproject needs to be managed.’’47 State inquiries
from Secretary of Administration and Finance Natsios received similarly worded tongue lashings.
Such dismissive treatment of state and federal agents introduced serious doubts that the long-
standing state–federal road-building relationship was in good order. During the 2000 McCain hear-
ings, US Department of Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater repeatedly emphasized that the
MTA’s actions ‘‘significantly tarnished the Federal–State partnership that dates back to 1916,’’
when the landmark Federal Aid Road Act was passed. In order to ‘‘move forward expeditiously
to repair the breach of trust between Federal and State officials,’’ Slater returned federal oversight
from its district office in Massachusetts to Washington, DC, and instituted a new policy of ‘‘trust, but
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verify.’’ He also insisted that any remaining federal funds for the Big Dig be contingent upon an
‘‘enforceable commitment to a balanced, Statewide program,’’ one that requires that ‘‘the Massachu-
setts Highway Department reach agreement with the local officials.’’48
Slater’s concern for ‘‘balance’’ echoed anxieties voiced by others about the impact of the Big
Dig’s financial woes on additional projects financed under the federal ISTEA program and its
1998 reauthorization (Transportation Equity Act [TEA]-21), such as bridge repair and transit
improvements. Senator Kerry had lauded the road-building paradigm established under ISTEA
and TEA-21 for having ‘‘created a process by which we were supposed to really have a negotiation
between State and local officials [that] the Federal Government would sign off on.’’ He began the
hearings by expressing concern that the TEA-21 money ‘‘might become a victim of this overrun.’’
Inspector General Mead confirmed these worries when he informed the Congressional committee
that in order to pay down Central Artery costs, Massachusetts officials had effectively committed
almost half of the state’s federal transportation dollars ‘‘through the year 2011, which is, in fact
seven years after the scheduled completion of the project.’’49 Spiraling costs did more than erode
the confidence of federal officials; they threatened to destabilize the entire road-building paradigm
established under ISTEA and TEA-21.
Turnpike Authority officials’ efforts to keep these figures undisclosed meant that citizens were
kept in the dark about the long-term consequences of the Big Dig, and their representatives were
hamstrung in their efforts to pursue transportation alternatives. In Washington, DC, one Massachu-
setts congressman was ‘‘chastised’’ over Big Dig costs when he approached a House committee on a
separate matter regarding aid for public transportation. City officials in the greater Boston area
expressed concern that ‘‘the Big Dig [was] siphoning off’’ funds needed for local bridge and high-
way repair.50 Subsequent reports validated these concerns, indicating that financial obligations held
by the MTA raised the total cost of the Big Dig to $22 billion, including $7 billion in debt that will
not be retired until 2038.51
The root of the trouble, according to Natsios, who in 2000 left his post as Secretary of Admin-
istration and Finance to straighten out the rocky finances of the MTA, was the poor trade-off
between public accountability and greater project efficiency. Responding to Senator McCain’s
request that witnesses speak to ways in which Congress could ‘‘improve fiscal accountability on the
Central/Artery Tunnel project and all federally funded transportation projects,’’ Natsios pinpointed
the decision to transfer the project to the Turnpike Authority. This, he claimed, was intended
to facilitate construction because State rules and regulations do cost more money. They increase the level
of accountability, but they also reduce efficiency and extend the level of time, the amount of time it costs
to do things because Government wants to be more accountable. We sometimes see efficiency and
accountability as the same thing. They are not, and if you carry one or the other too far, they affect the
other in a negative way. If you are too efficient, you will reduce accountability. If you are too accoun-
table, and you go too far in controlling things, then you can reduce the efficiency of it, and I think there is
a balance.
Natsios informed the committee that he had gone ‘‘back to the legislative records’’ to analyze the
debate that took place over this decision, and he found that ‘‘the focus was on transportation, not
on governance systems.’’52
Natsios’s argument cut to the heart of the matter. The ‘‘governance system’’ that produced the
original Massachusetts Turnpike (and the interstate highway system into which it was incorporated)
prioritized traffic efficiency over accountability to a broader range of public demands, including
healthy citizens, cities, and environments. The centralized authority responsible for highway con-
struction in the 1950s and early 60s took a heavy beating in subsequent decades. The result was a
more level balance between efficiency and accountability in the late-twentieth century. But as a
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result of this negotiation of political authority, highway planners found it much more difficult to
push forward large projects on the scale of the interstate system.
The desire to fast-track a megaproject such as the Big Dig in the 1990s might have led politicians
back to the age-old debate over the relative virtues of public process and expert authority. But
as Natsios’s remarks suggest, this debate over alternative systems of governance never really
happened: Massachusetts legislators ignored the lessons of the interstate era and the subsequent
Freeway Revolts as a new balance was struck. They interpreted accountability in a narrow, financial
sense, reflective of a consensus built around the virtues of privatization and skepticism of statist
solutions to public problems.53 Though plans for the interstate system were produced in the
1950s (at a time of great faith in the works of government) and plans for the Big Dig were developed
during the 1970s (at a time of deep public cynicism), the implementation of each project relied on a
set of political actors and institutions that devalued the role of deliberative democracy in transpor-
tation policy making.
In 2005, when the Big Dig again became a topic of Congressional hearings, this time before the
House Committee on Government Reform, the question of ‘‘governance systems’’ returned to the
foreground. By this time, the project was 96 percent complete, but a major tunnel leak in September
2004 sparked new investigations. The leak spilled 300 gallons of water per minute onto the roadway,
causing a 10-mile backup and a predictable stream of questions over the tunnels’ safety, the cost of
repair, and the relative responsibility of contractors, project managers, and public officials. While
subsequent investigations found the tunnels to be safe, they disclosed a troubling history of missed
opportunities to ensure construction quality and keep future repair costs down.
Again, the structure of public–private collaboration and consequent limitations on oversight
appeared to be at the root of the Big Dig’s predicament. Inspector General Kenneth Mead reiterated
his earlier frustrations with the MTA’s ‘‘deliberate misrepresentations.’’ But this time he singled out
the ‘‘Integrated Project Organization’’ for having ‘‘hindered the Authority’s ability to oversee Bech-
tel/Parsons because Bechtel/Parsons had effectively become partners in the project.’’ This relation-
ship resulted in an anemic rate of cost recovery, so much so that in the eight years leading up to 2003,
it yielded just $30,000. By 2005, when that figure approached only $4 million, state legislators rec-
ommended that State Attorney General Thomas Reilly take control of cost recovery for some of the
$2.13 billion in ‘‘contract modifications’’ that stemmed from substandard workmanship. Reilly
agreed to take on the task, ‘‘a role normally performed by the owner or managing agency [i.e., the
MTA]’’ because he had serious misgivings about the MTA’s oversight capacity. Though much of the
previous cost-recovery efforts had targeted subcontractors, Reilly intended to focus ‘‘squarely on
Bechtel . . . which had responsibility for quality assurance on this project.’’54
Ultimately, placing Central Artery/Tunnel project management in the hands of a public authority,
operating in virtual partnership with its chief contractor—the consequence of trading public over-
sight for greater efficiency—turned out to be a poor gamble. As the Integrated Project Organization
approached the end of its tenure in December 2005, MTA Chairman Matthew Amorello, who, like
his predecessor, had run the authority with imperial disregard for public opinion, offered up the half-
hearted wish that there had been more ‘‘direct public management over the project,’’ though, he con-
ceded, ‘‘that’s 20-20 hindsight.’’55 In the final analysis, Mead agreed that the project’s ‘‘problematic
history presents many lessons in how not to manage a public works mega-project.’’56 When impro-
perly installed bolts led to the collapse of 12 tons of concrete ceiling panels in the I-90 tunnel on July
10, 2006, crushing a motorist to death, the Big Dig’s legacy—already in question—was sealed.
‘‘Invisible’’ Highways and the Legacy of the Big Dig
Even as cost recovery proceedings, the patching of leaks, and the ceiling collapse investigation con-
tinued, officials in other metropolitan areas in the United States expressed serious interest in
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expansive tunneling projects as they debated solutions to their own transportation problems. Of
course, the history of the Big Dig—part triumphal narrative, part cautionary tale—loomed large
in these conversations.57 In the short-term, ‘‘tunnel vision’’ captured the attention of transportation
planners. Between 2000 and 2006, New York highway engineers seriously entertained the possibil-
ity of replacing the aging Tappan Zee Bridge with a tunnel underneath the Hudson River, a proposal
that grew out of a grassroots citizen campaign.58 In California, new tunnel-boring technology made
feasible a controversial South Pasadena tunnel that has advanced through several phases of study by
Los Angeles County transportation officials but still faces significant public resistance.59 And in
Washington, Seattle politicians backed a $4.25 billion tunnel plan that would bury an elevated sec-
tion of State Route 99, the earthquake-damaged, half-century-old, 4-mile Alaskan Way Viaduct.
The delays, rising costs, and growing public distrust associated with the Big Dig cast a shadow
over all these projects, but it most profoundly influenced the fate of the Seattle tunnel. At first,
Washington state officials strongly opposed the plans, citing Boston’s experience with the Central
Artery/Tunnel. Congressional legislators were similarly reluctant to support the plan. When House
Transportation Committee chair Don Young (Alaska – Dem.) agreed to provide a limited federal
subvention of $220 million, he reportedly added a note to the dollars: ‘‘No Big Dig.’’60 By February
2008, Seattle voters agreed, rejecting the tunnel proposal and supporting the reclamation of the
waterfront urban street system. According to Seattle Deputy Mayor Tim Ceis, a tunnel advocate,
‘‘the Big Dig experience was certainly used against us,’’ as anti-highway activists kept discussion
of Boston’s fatal tunnel collapse—and the fact that B/PB was to be the lead contractor on the tunnel
project—in the public spotlight. Nick Licata, City Council president and opponent of the tunnel
plan, summed it up this way: ‘‘The Big Dig is the nightmare that we all have here in Seattle.’’61
Indeed, with the legacy of the Big Dig looming large, state and local politicians, transportation
officials and stakeholder advisory groups, despite a year-long assessment, failed to reach consensus
on how to proceed. By November 2008, most observers thought the tunnel carried too high a risk and
too high a price tag. Indeed, on December 11, officials at theWashington State Department of Trans-
portation announced that the only affordable options were to replace the viaduct or to tear it down
and reroute State Route 99 through the city’s street system. Then a remarkable turnaround happened.
Faced with the prospect of through traffic snarling city streets, Seattle’s Chamber of Commerce
joined forces with a local transportation think tank and other downtown stakeholders to revive a
hybrid tunnel plan. The new proposal, approved by Governor Christine Gregoire in 2009, retained
the elevated expressway north and south of the city but routed traffic underground through a 2-mile
long, four-lane, single-bore tunnel traversing Seattle’s waterfront district.
As was the case with the ABC in Boston, the support of business elites was essential. Indeed,
Citizens for a Better Waterfront, a protunnel group instrumental in its success, received tens of thou-
sands of dollars from land developers and engineering firms, including an indirect donation of
$10,000 from B/PB. Despite the support from the Big Dig’s lead contractor, officials at the state
department of transportation went to great lengths to distinguish the two projects, even producing
a fact sheet that emphasized the comparatively modest nature of the tunneling project, and the
clearer financial and jurisdictional arrangements put in place to protect against the sorts of delays,
cost overruns, and changes in administration that marred the Big Dig.62
Despite the negative connections many attached to the Big Dig, then, tunnel projects still retained
a significant measure of support. For instance, Harry Capers, Tunnels Committee Chairman for the
American Association of State Highway, and Transportation Officials, claimed that tunneling proj-
ects will stay in style since they appeared to ‘‘generate less political dust than surface roads.’’ Capers
argued that tunnels were ‘‘catching on’’ because of the ‘‘new interest in invisible highways—getting
them out of sight.’’63 Others saw in the support for the Seattle tunnel evidence of a larger trend
toward tearing down the elevated expressways of the 1950s. The Congress for the New Urbanism,
a neighborhood development organization, cited San Francisco, Milwaukee, and Portland as model
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cities in this regard, and developed a North American list of ‘‘freeways without futures’’ that
included highways in Seattle, Bronx, Buffalo, New Haven, New Orleans, Syracuse, Louisville,
Trenton, Toronto, and Washington, DC.64
With the Big Dig precedent producing resentment and reticence, and with interstate-era infra-
structure continuing to age, federal officials at the US Department of Transportation have found
themselves divided over whether to advance the localization or the privatization of road-
building authority. On one hand, United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) leadership
has maintained its commitment to promoting local voices in the setting of state transportation
agendas, as it did in ensuring that future transportation expenditures in Massachusetts would go
to a more balanced program consistent with ISTEA protocols. On the other hand (and more
recently), Secretary Mary Peters (2006–09) transformed the Department of Transportation during
the Bush administration into a strong advocate of public–private partnerships as a means of rescu-
ing the nation’s failing bridges and highways.65
Ironically, then, while urban leaders have used the Big Dig ‘‘nightmare’’ to justify more cautious,
nonfreeway solutions to their traffic problems, many federal and state officials have continued to
embrace—and expand—Boston’s legacy of highway privatization. The Illinois and Indiana legisla-
tures led the way in this area in 2005 and 2006, negotiating multi-billion-dollar, decades-long
leases of the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road to an international consortium. Proposals
for such public–private partnerships (often called PPP or P3 arrangements) have grown in fre-
quency across the United States, where states and localities face looming infrastructure costs and
shrinking public budgets.66
Such P3 arrangements remain controversial, with one high-ranking Congressman questioning
whether such partnerships constituted little more than the ‘‘outsourcing’’ of the ‘‘political will’’ that
was necessary to finance bold transportation initiatives.67 Indeed, as Alec Montgomery, head of the
Royal Bank of Scotland’s New York City-based infrastructure finance arm, explained: ‘‘there’s a
debate brewing in Washington as to how prudent it is to sell these public projects to outside inves-
tors. On one hand, investors would be motivated to keep costs down, and there’s a good chance you
wouldn’t see such boondoggles as the Big Dig. But on the other hand, there’s got to be a fear that
investors will put profits ahead of the people.’’68 Interestingly, while Montgomery voiced popular
anxieties about privatization schemes, he still viewed the lessons of the Big Dig in a rather narrow
way: as little more than a ‘‘boondoggle’’ that would have been avoided had efficiency-minded man-
agers and private investors been at the helm. Of equal importance, however, is the fact that the Big
Dig’s problems stemmed, in part, from too much faith in corporations and quasi-public agencies
intent on insulating their work from public oversight.
These trade-offs between businesslike efficiency and public-minded accountability were at the
heart of the closed system planning process that characterized the building of the interstate highway
system and its controversial urban arterial segments in the 1950s and 60s. The road-building para-
digm that emerged in the decades after 1970 fostered greater public input into transportation plan-
ning, but it also allowed megaprojects to grow in size, cost, and duration. These developments, in
turn, created new pressures to limit project transparency, as Massachusetts citizens elected leaders
who traded away hard-won forums for civic deliberation in their efforts to control the costliest urban
megaproject in American history.69 In so doing, they allowed Big Dig management to revert to the
old governing structures of the interstate era, when public authority was concentrated in distant,
unresponsive bureaucracies.70 In June 2009, Governor Deval Patrick sought to end what he referred
to as the ‘‘Big Dig culture’’ by signing a major transportation reform bill that would eventually elim-
inate the Turnpike Authority and transfer its highway, bridge, and tunnel management functions to
the newly created Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT). As late as August 2009,
two months before their final meeting, MTA board members were still operating under a cloak of
secrecy, refusing to make public more than the barest details of their $430 million budget.71 Even
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after MTA operations were absorbed by the MassDOT, old patterns persisted. In February 2010, a
110-pound light fixture fell from the tunnel ceiling. Despite the echoes of the 2006 ceiling collapse,
officials at the transportation agency remained silent about the hazard for weeks. They also avoided
putting their investigative findings in writing, even as it became clear that 25,000 salt-corroded fix-
tures would need to be replaced at a cost of $200 million. When asked why engineers appeared wary
of disclosure, MassDOT Secretary Jeffrey Mullan (2009 to present) suggested that these habits were
deeply ingrained in the ‘‘old practice at the Turnpike Authority.’’72
In light of this culture of concealment, rooted in what one study of modern megaprojects termed a
‘‘democracy deficit,’’ it is no wonder that the move toward further highway privatization has been
seen by many transportation analysts and public officials as especially alarming.73 Certainly
business-minded efficiency and shareholder accountability have the potential to reduce construction
time and control expenses on transportation megaprojects. Big Dig managers held out just these sorts
of promises. But their misgivings regarding the public’s role in transportation policy making and
their flawed handling of the project fed a popular distrust that threatened to engulf not just the Big
Dig, but other major undertakings, such as the replacement of the Alaskan Way Viaduct. To those
operating in the shadow of the Big Dig, from federal officials to city leaders, it was clear that the
diminution of government also carried high costs. Indeed, the Central Artery/Tunnel project offers
up a powerful case study in the hazards of privatization and deregulation, and the limits of Amer-
icans’ current methods of transportation governance. For the great paradox of late-twentieth-
century highway politics was that the Big Dig, once lauded as the product of a locally sensitive,
late-twentieth-century road-building paradigm, ultimately undercut long-running efforts to expand
public control of transportation planning.
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